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DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The Delta Chi Fraternity, since its
establishment at the Dickinson School of
Law, has never enjoyed a more progressive
condition than the present. Sixteenmembers have returned, ten of whom are seniors
and six middle men. So far this year
three men have been initiated into the
mysteries of this Greek Letter Fraternity,
viz: Newton R. Turner, '02, Albert S.
Tongbottom, '03, Robert B. Boryer, '02.
The necessity for better accommodations
being apparent, the quarters have been
enlarged and refurnished throughout.
SCHOOL NOTES.
THE FORUM again desires to call attention to the use of the books in the library
or the School. Those who have occasion
to take books from the shelves will confer
a great favor to the student body at large
by replacing such books when they have
finished the use of them. Unless these
books are replaced on the shelves the
Faculty will have to resort to stringent
means for the enforcement of this request.
During the latter part of October a
petition was circulated for subscriptions

for the retention of Coach Boyle at his
post. One hundred dollars was raised by
the Law School alone for this purpose.
Under Coach Boyle's supervision the team
has developed wonderfully. The Law
men on the team have shown up well,
and under the instructions of Coach Boyle
the team is the best Dickinson has produced for many years.
The term was somewhat broken by a
large percentage of the students going
home to vote. The interest shown by the
student body in the recent campaign was
considerable, and quite a number participated in the election both here and elsewhere. Now that the election is over, it
is hoped that the student body will again
settle down to work and make a good
showing at the ehd of the year.

THE DICKINSON-STATE GAME.
Such a prominent part in the State game
was taken by the Law School and its representatives that some mention of it is necessary in the FORUM.
At a highly enthusiastic mass meeting
of the law students it was decided that the
law school should attend in a body, and
should march out to the grounds, hedded
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by a band, and the committee of arrangements were given authority to reserve a
complete section of the bleachers for the
law students.
Promptly at 2 P. M., the parade of law
men was formed by Chief Marshal Watson, and headed by the Carlisle Band and
the Law School banner, they marched out
to the grounds, and took the bleacher provided for them. The Law School men
had distinct songs and yells and were a
conspicuous factor in the cheering during
the entire game, the four law men on the
team being especially singled out.
Immediately on the kick-off, Cannon
(Law) distinguished himself by falling on
the ball from State's fumble, his quickness proving to be the indirect cause of the
first touchdown. Space forbids us to detail the play but throughout the game the
plucky line plunging of Cannon, the
ground gaining ability of Phillips, McGuffie's general playing and goal kicking and
Core's phenomenal work in opening up the
line, were all greatly in evidence, and
when the struggle was over, Dickinson
had won her greatest victory and State's
pride was humbled in the dust by a score
of 18-0.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The chief feature of the past few meetings
of the society has been the "Session of the
House of Representatives" which extended over three nights and was of the
very greatest benefit to all the members,
in the discussion of political subjects and
of parliamentary procedure. The sessions
were at all times interesting and exciting,
the two part!es being very evenly balanced,
the Republicans having only a majority of
5, in a total vote of 46.
The House was opened by Prof. Woodward, as speaker, and proceeded immediately to business, hearing the conflicting
reporfs in an election contest, and finally
voting to seat the Republican claimant.
After the reading of the dignified and able
message of the President, by Clerk of the
House Elmes, the following bills were introduced:
No. 1. A bill to provide for an increased
Army an& Navy.
No. 2. A bill to provide that the books

of interstate corporations should be open
to the public.
No. 3. A bill to provide for Compulsory
Arbitration in Labor troubles.
A motion from Mr. Piper, leader of the
Democrats, to "Impeach Win. McKinley,
President of the Uiiited States."
All these measures were, on the various
nights, vigorously debated. Bill No. 1,
after much wrangling, was defeated by
clever tactics on the part of the Democratic
leaders. Bill No. 2 was passed. Bill No.
3 was killed in committee, and the impeachment motion was withdrawn on the
last night of the session by the Democratic
Committee of Prosecution. The great
success of this program was due to the
earnest and hearty co-operation of all the
members, who by their attendance and
interest made it possible, and to the kindness of Prof. F. C. Woodward, to whose
dignified and able conduct of the sessions,
much of their value is due.
At the election of officers for the ensuing
term of six weeks the following were
chosen:
President-Nicholls.
Vice Presidents--Walsh and Brock.
Secretary-Lord.
Treasurer-Adamson.
Corresponding Secretary-Lonergen.
Librarian--Shomo.
Sheriff-Core.
Prothonotary-Lauer.
Auditor-Devor.
Janitor-Helreigel.
Critic-Valentine.
Ex. Com.-Shipman, Kline and Harpel.
The Allison Society has never been in
better condition for good work, and with
the many new members continually being
added to its rolls it hopes to accomplish
more this year than ever in its past history.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.

At the next meeting of the society on
November 16, 1900, a new administration
will begin. The society is fortunate in the
election of Mr. Chares S. Davis to the office
of President. Mr. Davis has been an efficient member of the Executive Committee
during the past six weeks; and we feel
safe in predicting that under his supervision, and under that of his chief ally, the
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retiring President, Mr. J. L. Rhodes, the
society will enjoy a season of profitable
work.
The character of the meetings held lately
has been similar to that of those noticed
last month in this column. Especial attention has been given to debating. The
merits of the pardoning power as exercised
by the executive authority, and the propriety of assessing public officers for -campaign purposes, formed the subjects for
two interesting debates. A Moot Court
was held, the Seniors sitting as judges and
four Juniors appearing as counsel. Orations have been rendered by Messrs.
Schantz and Minnich at recent meetings.
On another occasion a recitation was delivered by Mr. W. T. Stauffer.
The members of this society cannot consider too seriously the work done at these
meetings. To be able to speak in public
is of first importance. We will meet with
no better opportunity for cultivating this
art than is afforded us here, within the
walls of our chosen association, where we
are assured of a sympathetic and indulgent
audience.
The principal officers for the next term
are: President, Davis; Vice-President,
Osborne; Secretary, Minnich.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Martin F. Duffy, '98, was admitted to
the Schuylkill county bar.
William H. Stamey, '96, was in town
recently. He is devising liberal things
for the bchool as ever.
Neil C. McEwen, '93, stopped in Carlisle,
October 26, on his way home from the
Supreme Court.
Jonathan R. Smith, '98, was in Carlisle
during the past month. He is sharing an
office with William J. Shaeffer,'93, and Jas.
H. Payran, '93, in the Girard building.
Chas. E. Daniels, '98, of Scranton, has
been stumping Lackawanna county for
the Republican party during the recent
campaign.

A. Newton Wallace, '00, has formed a
partnership with J. C. Cole, of Pripple
Creek, Colorado. He states that he is

nicely located, and has a bright outlook
for building a practice there. He also
states that Cripple Creek is the greatest
gold mining camp in the United States,
and it is expected that about $30,000,000 of
gold will be produced this year.
S. W. Kirk, '96, of Fulton county, has
been elected as a Democrat to the Lower
House of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania by a handsome majority, Bryan
carrying the county by 185 and Kirk by
506.
H. D. Carey, '96, of Scranton, spent
several days in Carlisle about Nov. 10th.
Win. Francis Shean, '96, of Scranton,
spent several days in town during November. He delivered many speeches in
Lackawanna county during the late campaign.

C. W. Albert Rochow, '96, of York, was
in town November 12th for a few hours.
He took an active part on the Democratic
side in the late campaign.
Walter B. Freed, '99, was admitted to
the Berks county bar recently.
Chas. G. Moyer, '99, Oliver G. Lentz,
'00, and Wilson S. Rothermel, '00, were
admitted to practice in the several courts
of Berks county during this month. They
were commended for their excellent examination. This certainly speaks well
for the Dickinson Law School.
Isaiah Scheeline, '99, passed a creditable
preliminary examination before the Blair
county bar committee.
John G. Miller, '00, and Garrett B.
Stevens, '99, were visitors in town during
the month of November.
Walter L. Houck, '99, spent several
hours in town November 12th. He contemplated entering the school for his third
year at the opening of the term, but was
unable to do so on account of his ill health.
John 0. Adamson, '02, was elected
captain of the base ball team. John is
one of the mainstays of the team and we
have no doubt but that he will make an
efficient captain.
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Katz,
Merkel Landis, '98, having resigned Ilis Case No. 30. Nichols,
position as librarian of Cumberland county,
Turner.
Rhodes, F.B
has gone to Indianapolis, Ind., where he
Taylor, J.
31. Bouton,
Mays,
intends to practice his profession.
Osborne.
Lonergen.
Johnston, 3.
32. McIntire,
Sterrett,
Gross.
Chas. S. K line.
Graul, J.

Adair Herman, '98, has been appointed
librarian of Cumberland county.

BOOK REVIEW.
The Collector Publishing Co., of Detroit,
Mich., has just issued a new treatise oi
The Law of Real Property, by John G.
Hawley and Malcolm McGregor, an advertisement of which appears in this issue.
A careful examination of this work will
convince one that the authors have not
failed in their attempt to treat this branci
of the law in a concise and up-to-date
form, as well as arrange systematically the
various divisions of the Law of Real
Estate.
The following is a cantinuation of the
schedule of counsel in the Moot Court
cases issued in last month's FoRUm:
PLAINTIFF.

Case No. 20. Brock,
Moon.
Alexander,
21. Points,
Sterrett.
Henderson.
22. Thorne,
McIntire,
23. Rhodes, J.
Adamson.
24. Frank,
Katz.

3. Deal,

Holcomb,

Kemp.
Piper.
Mitchell, J.
34. Rhodes, J., Thorne,
Gerber.
Trude.
Kern, J.
35. Donohoe,
Cooper,
Hickernell, Hoagiand.
Frank, J.
36. Mowry,
Schanz,
Shomo.
Sherbine.
Holcomb, J.

MOOT COURT.
WM. FERGUSON vs. BOROUGH OF
CARLISLE.

DEFENDANT.

Nichols,
Osborne.
J.
Trude,
Turner.
J.
Lonergen,
Rhodes, F.,
Drumheller.
Elmes.
Graul,
Kostenbauder.

Hess, J.
"

"

25. Alexander,
Kern,
Henderson.
Mitchell.
Harpel, J.
26. Davis,
MacConnell,
Detrich.
Brock.
Piper, J.
27. Boryer,
Edwards,
Basehore.
Kemp.
Dan. Kline, J.
28. Minnich,
Clark,
Kennedy.
Kline.
Lightner, J.
29. Moon,
Points,
Crary.
Claycomb.
Deal, J.

Ordinances-Borough'sliability for nonenforcement.
STATEMfENT OF THE CASE.

On April 2, 1899, Ferguson, while walking across the street at a regular crossing
was run into and thrown down by a bicycle on which Chas. Malone was riding.
Malone rang no bell nor otherwise gave
notice of his coming, nor, though the
nightwas dark when the collision occurred,
had he a light. Although the borough
had enacted an ordinance requiring bicyclists to exhibit lights and ring bells on
approaching crossings, it was generally
violated by cyclists and its penalties had
never been enforced. Had they been,
Ferguson contended that this accident
would probably have been avoided. He
therefore sues the borough in trespass.
SHIPMAN and MACCONNELL for plaintiff.
Public roads shall be kept clear of impediments.-Act June 13, 1836, P. L. 551;
Twp. v. Craver, 125 Pa. 24; Dean v. New
Milford Twp., 5 W. & S. 545.
Municipality has constructive notice if
its supervision would result in knowledge
of the impediments.-Trego v. Honey-
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brook, 160 Pa. 76; Baker v. N. E. Borough,
151 Pa. 234; Frazier v. Borough, 172 Pa.
407.
VALENTINE and DRUMHELLER for the
borough.
A borough is not responsible for the
neglect of duty on the part of its officers in
respect to the enforcement of its ordinances
though such neglect results in injuries to
private persons.-1 Trickett on BorOugh
Law 272; Am. & Eng. Ency., 15 Vol. 1154;
Pierce v. City of New Bedford, 129 Mass.
534; MfcDade v. Chester City, 117 Pa. 414;
Hines v. City of Charlotte, 72 Mich. 283.
See also Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35
Pa. 324; Grant v. Erie City, 69 Pa. 420;
Wheeler v. City of Plymouth, 9 Am. St.
Rep. 837 (116 Ind. 158).
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In this case, the plaintiff, who was injured by a private person, seeks to recover
from the borough on the theory that if the
borough executive authority had enforced
an ordinance, which the person causing
the injury was violating when the accident happened, the event which occasioned
the injury would not have occurred. On
principle and in the light of the numerous authorities which by the diligence of
the counsel for defense have been brought
to our attention, it would seem that the
action cannot be maintained.
The liability of a municipal corporation
for tort depends upon the nature of the
misfeasance. In the exercise of powers
essentially public in their nature, where
the corporation is in effect an agent of the
State and sovereign in its capacity, It is
not subject to suits for acts or omissions
occurring in the exercise of such power.
It is only in so far as it exercises powers
involving private and local advantage or
benefit, that it is held liable for failure to
properly conduct its affairs.
In this case the plaintiff complains of
the nonfeasance of the executive authority
of the borough, in not properly exercising
its police power. For such the borough is
not liable; these officers represent the
State. Elliott v. Phila. City, 75 Pa. 347.
A municipal corporation which passes
an ordinance regulating the safety of its
streets is not liable for injuries arising
from its violation by private citizens, or
for its failure to strictly enforce the ordinance.-Carr v. Northern Liberties. 35 Pa.
324; Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420; MlcDade v.

Chester City, 117 Pa. 414; Pierce v. Bedford, 129 Mass. 534. See also 1 Trickett on
Borough Law 272; and cases cited in Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 15, page 1154.
Judgment for the defendant on demurrer.
COMMONWEALTH OF PA. vs. HARRY
SMITH.
New trial-Expert testimony-Medical
witnesses-H-omicide-Bloodspots.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant was convicted by a jury
of murder in the first degree for the unlawful killing of William Jones. Among
the evidence offered by the commonwealth,
taken subject to exception by the defendant, wws the following:
1. Medical witnesses were allowed to
testify the positions in which the parties
stood when the fatal blow was struck,
basing their opinions on the evidence upon
the ground of blood spots and the stab
wound in the body.
2. Non expert witnesses were allowed
to state that certain spots upon the deceased's clothing were blood spots.
3. Witnesses were allowed to state that
the defendant was guilty of adulterous intercourse with the wife of the deceased.
A motion is now made for a new trial by
the defendant, alleging that the court
erred in the admission of the above testimony.

For

the

motion

VALENTINE

and

THORNE.

Expert evidence as to the position of the
body at the time the wound was inflicted,
or as to the position of the person inflicting
is not admissible, as the jurors are competent to form independent opinions upon
these circumstances. A. & E. Encyclopedia, 12 vol. 2nd ed. 449; 4 vol. 2nd ed. 588;
Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245; People
v. Smith, 93 Cal. 445; People v. Westlake,
62 Cal. 303; McKee v. State, 82 Ala. 32;
People v. Hill, 116 Cal. 562; People v. Temperle, 94 Cal. 45.
The adulterous intercourse does not appear to have continued until near the time
of the killing; its admission was therefore
error. Ferriman v. Com, 44 Pa. 887.

For the commonwealth

STAUFFER

and

STE URETT.

An expert may give opinion as -to manner and means employed to inflict injury,
Com. v. Crossmise, 156 v. 304; Com. v.
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Lenox, 3 Brews. 249. Hence it was not
error to admit evidence under first assignment. Brum v. U. S., 18 S. C. R. 183;
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430.
Non experts may testify that spots are
blood spots. Games v. Com. 50 Pa. 319;
McLain v. Com., 99 Pa. 86.
Evidence under 3rd assignment was
properly admitted, State v. Watkins, 9
Con. 47, State v. Green, 35 Con. 203.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The first assignment of error presents a
somewhat novel question. The only reported case in this state, in which it has
even been suggested, §o far as we have
learned,is that of Commonwealth v.Lenox,
3 Brewster 249. There, it appears that a
physician being on the stand, the commonwealth proposed to ask him whether, if
the deceased was in a stooping position at
the time he was struck, the ball would
have taken the course which it did. Objection was made to the question, on the
ground that the reply would not be medical testimony, but the objection was overruled, though no reason was given by the
judge for his ruling.
It is to be regretted that Commonwealth
v. Lenox was not carried to the Supreme
Court on this question, for under the decisions in several other states, the ruling
there made would be clearly erroneous.
In Kennedy v. The People, 39 N. Y. 245,
it appears that on the trial the coroner,
who was a physician, was permitted to
testify to his opinion respecting the position of the deceased when the blows which
caused his dtath were given, and the court
of appeals held that the ruling was erroneous. Woodruff, J., saying: "The form,
nature, extent, depth, length, width and
direction of the wound being given, and
its precise location on the head, with a
general statement of the amount of force
requisite, and the probable shape of the
instrument, the jury can judge as well as
anyone in what position the head or body
probably was when the blow was given.
It is only where the matter inquired
* **
of lies within the range of the peculiar
skill and experience of the witness, and is
one of which the ordinary knowledge and
experience of mankind does not enable
them to see what inferences should be
drawn from the facts, that the witness
may supply opinions as their guide. But
on what ground it can be said that it re-

quires the peculiar science or professional
skill which physicians and surgeons possess, to determine the position in which a
man may be struck on the top of his head,
I am not able to perceive."
The same conclusion was reached in
People v. Smith, 93 Cal. 445, where the
court declared that the position of the
wound being given and the course taken
by the bullet known, the jury was fully as
competent to determine the relative positions of the parties to the difficulty as was
the expert witness. See also, People v.
Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; People v. Temperle,
94 Cal. 45; McKee v. State, 82 Ala. 32;
People v. Hill, 116 Cal. 562; Am. and Eng.
Ency of Law (2nd Ed.) Vol. 4, p. 588.
In view of such an array of adverse authority, it must be conceded that the i-ling in Coiimonwealth v. Lenox (supra) is
of little if any weight. The reasoning of
the cases to which we have referred appears
to us to be convincing, and we therefore
conclude that the admission of the testimony referred to in the first assignment of
error was erroneous.
The second and third assignments of error are not well founded. The rule is established beyond question, that non-expert
,witnessses may testify that certain spots
are blood spots. People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 485;,
Gaines v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 319;
People v. Deacons, 109 N. Y. 374; Dillard
v. State, 58 Miss. 368; McLain v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 86. It seems to be well
settled, also, that evidence of adultery between defendant and a third person, to
which adultery the deceased was an obstacle, may be introduced for the purpose of showing a ,motive for the crime.
State v. Green, 35 Conn. 203; Pierson v.
State, 79 N. Y. 424; Felix v. State, 18 Ala.
720; Hall v. State; 40 Ala. 698; Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, Vol. 9, p. 714; Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386.
Motion for a new trial granted.
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NORTHPORT BANK vs. MORRIS
WILLIS.
Collateral security-Negotiable notesTransfer after maturity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On January 5, 1900, Morris Willis delivered to Eben Smith a note for $1000.00,
payable in 60 days, signed by himself, as
collateral security for the payment of
$500.00 and interest which Willis' son,
Samuel, had borrowed from Smith. Smith
gave Willis a receipt stating that the note
was held as collateral.
On June 5, 1900, Smith endorsed the
note of Willis, and delivered it as collateral
for a loan from the plaintiff bank for
$1000.00. This note being unpaid the bank
demanded of Willis payment of his note.
Willis replied that he owed Smith nothing, his son Samuel having paid the $500
borowed with interest.
The bank then brings this suit.
PIPER for the plaintiff.
The transfer of the note after maturity
did not deprive it of its negotiable character. Tyler v. Young, 50 Pa. 143; Barton v.
Baker, 1 S. & R. 334.
MITCHELL and KEMP for defendant.
The note being three months past due
when transferred to the plaintiff a defense
is as available against it as if it was in
hands of original parties. Marsh v. Marshall, 53 Pa. 396; Clay v. Cotfrell, 18 Pa.
409; Snyder v. Riley, 6 Pa. 164.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The counsel for the plaintiff contended
during the argument, and cited authorities
to support his contention; that the transfer
of the note after its maturity did not deprive it of its negotiable character. While
we agree with him that the above is a
correct statement of the law, Bank v.
Crowell, 148 Pa. 284, we cannot see that it
is material or relevant to the question in
this case.
Had the note in question beentransferred
to the Northport Bank before its maturity
under the same circumstances as it was
transferred after its maturity, to wit: as
security for a present loan, and not to
secure an antecedent debt, we would have
thought the plaintiff an innocent holder
for value, Gleason v. Crider, 14 C. C. 670,
and hence that the defendant was liable

on this note, the same as on a note of the
same kind not given or held as collateral
security, Third National Bank v. Harrison,
10 Fed. Rep. 243.
As there is apparently no difference between the liability of the maker on notes
held as collateral, and those not so held,
Third National Bank v. Harrison, supra,
the fact that the note. was overdue when
procured by the Bank makes the defense
set up by the defendant as available as if
the note was held by the original parties.
Clay v.Cottrell,18 Pa.409;-Peale v.Addicks,
174 Pa. 549; Marsh v. Marshall, 53 Pa. 396.
Had this action been by Smith against
Willis there can be no doubt that the latter
would have had a valid defense.
As the Northport Bank has simply been
subrogated to Smith's rights, it follows
that the defence of payment of the original
debt can be introduced; the plaintiff's
action must therefore fail.
Judgment for defendant.
W. A. VALENTINE, J.
JOHN HENDERSON vs. ABRAM
HAYWARD.
Bill prayingfor an injunction.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff. defendant and twenty other
merchants in various businesses, in Mechanicsburg, signed an agreement: "We,
doing business in Mechanicsburg, agree to
close our places of business at six o'clock
every evening, except Saturdays, during
the months of May, June, July, August
and September."
After keeping this agreement until June,
Hayward began and continued to keep his
store open every evening until nineo'clock.
Henderson then filed this bill, praying for
an injunction to restrain Hayward from
continuing to violate his agreement.
ELMEs and DAvis for the plaintiff.
1. The promise of the plaintiff was sufficient consideration for the promise of the
defendant. Clark on Contracts, p. 165;
Buckingham v. Ludlum, 40 N. J. E. 422;
Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N. Y. 38.
2. The contract does not impose an unreasonable restraint upon trade. McClurg's
Appeal, 58 Pa. 51; Smith's Appeal, ]13
Pa. 579.
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3. The law does not regard such a contract as this as tending to create a monopoly, control prices or stifle competition.
Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173; Marsh v.
Russel, 66N. Y. 288; Gompersv. Rochester,
%
56 Pa. 194.
4. Where there is an express covenant
and an uncontroverted mischief arising
from its breach, equity will grant an injunction.
Clark's Appeal, 62 Pa. 447;
Harkinson's Appeal, 78 Pa. 196.
ADAMSON and KOSTENBAUDER for defendant.
1. The contract is in restraint of trade
and without consideration, and therefore
is void. Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173;
53 Pa. 467; Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa.
194.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The prayer of the complainant is opposed
upon two grounds :-First, that the agreement between the twenty-one merchants
of Mechanicsburg to close their places of
business at six o'clock in the evening
during the summer months is void for
want of consideration. Second, that it is
in restraint of trade and, therefore, should
not be enforced.
.First,as to the want of consideration.
The general rule is that, in order to support an action, the promise must have
been made upon a legal consideration
moving from the promisee to the promisor,
and to constitute such a consideration
there must be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. In
the agreement in question there appears to
be an obvious detriment to the promisee in
this engagement to forbear to carry on his
business after a certain hour of the day,
for it involves a surrender of a legal and
more or less valuable right. Stovell v.
McCutcheon, (Ky.) 44 L. R. A. 287. The
case is, in some respects, analogous to that
of a composition between creditors, where
the promise of each creditor to forbear to
insist upon his claim, is held to be the
consideration for the promisesof the others.
Laird v. Campbell, 92 Pa. 470; Perkins v.
Lockwood, 100 Mass. 249; Williams v.
Carrington,. 1 Hilton (N. Y. C. P.) 515;
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. VI, p.
377. And it is readily distinguishable
from those cases, in which it is held
that mutual subscriptions to some charitable or other common object are not enforcible. Ip those cases the object is one in
which the subscribers have no pecuniary

or legal interest; the promises of the subscribers are in reality made to the beneficiary and not to -each other; they are for
the benefit of a third party and not, in a
legal sense, for the mutual benefit of the
subscribers. Consequently, the subscriptions are not supported by a consideration
as between the subscribers and the beneficiary, and must be treated as mere gratuities. Cottage St. Church v. Kendall, 121
Mass. 528; First Presby. Church v. Cooper,
112 N. Y. 517.
,Second, as to restraint of trade. Contracts in restraint of trade, to be valid at
law, must be founded on a valuable consideration, be reasonable and impose no
genera) restraint on trade and industry;
and even though good at law, equity will
not enforce them if their terms be at all
hard. Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467. It is
difficult to see anything unreasonable or
even "hard" in the contract in question.
By its terms business is to be suspended
only during two or three of the quietest
hours of the day, and the contract is to
continue in force only during the warm
summer evenings of May, June, July,
August and September, a season of comparative inactivity in nearly every line of
commercial enterprise. The hardships, if
any, resulting to the public from such an
agreement, are more than offset by the
marked benefit to employees.
The ease is one in which an injunction
rather than an action at law is eminently
the proper remedy. The breach is a continuing one; a prolonged action at law
would not arrive at judgment until after
the expiration of the period covered by
the agreement, and the damages would be
exceedingly difficult of ascertainment.
The prayer for an injunction is granted.
HARPER BROS. vs. JOHN MEANS.
Bailment or sale.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On Sept. 1, 1899, the defendant wrote to
the plaintiff the following: "Send me fifty
copies of Webster's Dictionary, for which
I agree to pay $5.00 for such copies as I
shall sell. I am to have the right to return at my expense such copies as remain
unsold on Nov. 1, 1899."

THE FORUM.
The books were shipped and placed in
the storeroom of the defendant. The same
night an accidental fire destroyed them.
Means declines to pay, and the plaintiff
brings this suit to recover.
HARPEL and JOHNSTON for plaintiffs.
1. This was a "sale or return," and the
title passed to the transferee at once, and
the logs of goods must fall upon him.
Peck v. Heim,127 Pa. 600; Hotchkiss v.
Higgins, 52 Conn. 205; Jamison v. Gregary's Ex., 4 Metc. (Ky.) 363.
HSs and HOLCOMB for defendant.
1. This was a bailment for sale, and not
a conditional sale. Chamberlain v. Smith,
44 Pa. 431; Ott v. Sweatman, 166 Pa. 217 ;
Brown Bros. v. 1Ballington, 163 Pa. 76;
McCullough v. Porter, 4 W. & S. 177.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Harper Bros. ask payment for certain
volumes of Webster's Dictionary sent to
the defendant upon the receipt of the following order: "Send me fifty copies of
Webster's Dictionary, for which I agree
to pay $5.00 for such copies as I shall sell.
I am to have the right to return at my
expense such copies as remain unsold on
Nov. 1, 1899."
The books were received and destroyed
by fire on the same night while in the
storeroom of the defendant. If Means
was a bailee, and the destruction of the
bailed goods was accidental, then he is
not responsible for the goods lost without
his negligence. 3 Am. & Eng.Encyc. of
Law (2nd. ed.) 751. If, on the other
hand, there was a sale, the loss would fall
upon the vendee. Was this transaction
then a sale or a bailment ?
The fundamental distinction is that in
a bailment the identical thing delivered
in the same or altered form is to be restored, and the title to the property is not
changed; while in a sale no obligation to
return the specific article exists, but the
party receiving it is at liberty to return
another thing of equal value in the form
of money or otherwise, and becomes a
debtor to make the return. 2Am. &Eng.
Encyc. of Law (2nd ed.) 735. Was there
an obligation on the part of the defendant
to return the books?
If the transaction assumes the form of
a sale on trial, then the title does not pass
-Dewey v. Erie, 14 Pa. 211 ; but if, on
the other hand, the understanding of the

parties is that the title to the goods shall
pass immediately to the buyer, subject to
the right to return, it will be a sale.
Tiedeman on Sales, 213.
In the case at bar the evidence shows
that the goods were purchased subject to
the right to return unsold copies. If the
agreement had shown that the defendant
was to act as a consignee or factor, we
would have held that the transaction was
a bailment, as was done in Bridgeport
Organ Co. v. Guildin, 3 D. R. 649, in
McCullough v. Porter, 4 W. & S. 177, and
in Brown Bros. v. Ballington, 163 Pa. 76.
In all of these cases the relations qf the
parties as consignee was fixed by the
agreements, and in these respects are to
be distinguished from the case before us.
From the facts as they appear, we must
hold that the transaction was a sale, that
the title passed to Means, and that he is
therefore liable for the value of the goods.
WM. SMITH vs. JESSE MILLER.
Liability of grantee of realty for encumbrances.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On Oct. 1, 1899, Samuel Diveu executed
a bond for $5,000 secured by a mortgage on
certain property in Carlisle to Wim. Smith.
On April 1, 1900, Diven sold the property to Jesse Miller for $6,000, $1,000 in
cash being paid to Diven, and the property being taken subject to the mortgage
of $5,000, in which Smith was the mortgagee. On May 1, 1900, Miller paid to
Smith the interest on the mortgage to
that time. In September, 1900, the property was sold under the mortgage for
$2,000. The plaintiff now brings this action against Miller for the deficiency.
W.

]H.

TAYLOR and BASEHORE for

plaintiff.
One who buys land subject to a mortgage
becomes personally liable to pay the debt.
Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. 436; Campbell v.
Shrum, 3 W. 60; Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,
86 Pa. 89.
FRANK and HENDERSON for defendant.

The grantee, by buying subject to the
encumbrance, did not become personally
liable. The specified land, only, is liable.
Scott v. Field, 7 W. 360; Ins. Co. v. Miller,
89 Pa. 26; Act of June 12, 1878; 2 P. & L.
4063.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of assumpsit brought by
the plaintiff to recover a certain sum of
money. The'plaintiff conveyed to Samuel
Diven a certain property, receiving in payment some cash, and a bond of $5,000.00,
secured by a mortgage upon the land.
Subsequently the property was conveyed
to the defendant subject to tile payment
of the mortgage. The property was sold
by the sheriff for $2000, and Smith brings
this action to recover the balance due.
It has been suggested that the sheriff's
sale was premature under the act of 1705.
This is not, however, a question for us to
consider in a collateral proceeding.
The objection for us to examine arises
from the provisions of the act of June 12,
1878, P. L. 205, see, 1, which provides that
the grantee of real estate shall not be liable
for encumbrances thereon, unless there
shall be "express words in the deed of
conveyance stating that.the grant is made
on condition that the grantee assuming
personal liability :Provided,that the use
of the words under and subject to the payment of such encumbrance shall not be
construed to make such grantee personally
as aforesaid."
Prior to this act of assembly a recovery
could have been had in an actiou by the
original grantor against the second vendee,
and even now an action can be maintained
by the first vendee against his grantee for
the breach of covenant. Lenox et. al. vs.
Brower 160 Pa. 191; Blood vs. Crew Levick
Co. 171 Pa. 339; Blood vs. Crew Levick
Co. 177 Pa. 606. But we do not think that
the facts as shown by the plaintiff can be
said to bring the case within the provisions
of the act of 1878. Wonderlich for use vs.
Sadler et. al. 189 Pa. 469; Blood vs. Crew
Levick Co. 171 Pa. 339; andjudgment upon
the special verdict is therefore entered for
the defendant.

took the note, but; failed to furnish the
horses. On the same day on which it was
received Elvin took it to the cashier of the
Merchants' Bpnk, who, Nthout the consent of the discount committee, of which
he was not a member, discounted the note.
Elvin told the cashier that the note was
given for a pair of horses, which as yet he
had not delivered.
The note had written upon its face a
statement that if the note was paid before
maturity a discount of ten per cent. would
be allowed.
TRUDE and GRAUL for plaintiff.
1. In the sale of a specific chattel the
title rests in the vendee before delivery of
possession. Terry v. Wheeler, 25 X . Y.
520; Golden v. Ogden, 15 Pa. 528; Scott v.
Wells, 6 W. & S. 357.
2. Note was negotiable, and bank has
rights of bonafide holder for value. Ernst
v. Steckman, 74 Pa. 13; Bristol v. Warner,
19 Cbnn. 7; Zimmerman v. Anderson, 67
Pa. 421.
ALE ANDER and CLARIC for defendants.
1. Memorandum on a note, to the effect
that if paid before maturity a less amount
will be due, renders the note non-negotiable. Gray v. Mortimer, 7 C. C. R. 671 ;
Fralick v. Norton, 2 Mich. 130; Lamb v.
Story, 45 Mich. 488; 52 Mich. 525.
2. Assignee of non-negotiable instrument takes it subject to the original
equities, and must sue in the name of the
assignor. Birckleback v. Wilkins, 22 Pa.
26; Edgar v. Kline, 6 Pa. 327.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
In Woods v. North, 84 Pa. 407, the court
did not permit a recovery by the holder
against an endorser upon a note containing aclause, "and five per cent. collection
fee if not paid when due," upon the ground
that the amount of the note was uncertain, and hence the note was not'negotiable. See also Johnson v. Speer, 92 Pa.
227. An instrument provides that " it is
agreed that this note may be paid at any
time before maturity, and that interest at
the rate of eighteen per cent. per annum
MERCHANTS' BANK vs. ORRIS
shall be deducted till due." This stipuTEMPEST.
lation renders the contract uncertain and
Negotiabilityof note as affected by uncer- contingent both as to the time of payment
and the amount to be paid, and is incontainty in amount.
sistent with the essential character of a
STATEXENT OF THE CASE.
negotiable promissory note. Way v.
On January 10, 1900, Orris Tempest exe- Smith, 111 Mass. 523. An instrument is
cuted a note for $1,000 to Win. Elvin, in made payable on or before two years, with
payment of a certain pair of horses. Elvin ten per cent. interest, and is thus far deft-
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nite and certain; yet the subsequent
clause, "if this note is paid within one
year no interest to be paid," destroys the
essential element of certainty. Lamb v.
Story, 45 Mich. 488. The note in Gray v.
Mortimer, 7 C.C.671, contained this agreement: "If this note is paid before maturity
five per cent. discount is allowed." This
agreement the court held made the note
not negotiable, because the sum to be paid
was uncertain. "It is settled by an uninterrupted series of decisions that any
language put upon any portion of the face
or back of a promissory note by the maker
before delivery is part of the contract; and
if by any such language the payment of
it Is not necessary to be made at all events
and of the full sum in lawful money, and
at ittime certain to arrive and subject to
no contingency, the note is not negotiable." Costello v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293;
Iron City N. Bank v. McCord, 139 Pa. 52.
From these determinations we conclude
that the note in suit is notnegotiable, and
the demurrer may therefore be sustained
upon the technical ground that the assignee cannot maintain this suit in his
own name. Postv. Ry. Co., 171 Pa. 615.
We think the plaintiff must also fail
upon the merits qf the case. A sale contemplates the transfer of the absolute
property in personalty ; the right to possession is an incident of the absolute
property. It is the duty of the vendor
to deliver, i. e., to transfer the possession
to the vendee. Gray v. Walton, 107 N.
Y. 254; Benj. on Sales, 880 1013. It is
this duty to deliver which gives the vendee the right to maintain replevin against
the vendor for the chattel sold. Woodsy.
Nixon, Add. 131 (1793). Where the title
cannot pass until selection or appropriation is made, delivery becomes an essential to the sale itself. "Orders for goods
may be received, but until they are transferred, or set apart, to the purchaser, the
sale is incomplete. Delivery either actual
or constructive is an essential ingredient
in a sale of personal property. An agreement to sell is only executory until the
contract is completed by delivery." Garbracht v. The Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 449.
In the case at bar the payee and assignor
"failed to furnish a certain pair of horses."
Whether this "failure to furnish" was

simply a failure to transfer the possession
Of the horses, or whether it was a failure
to procure and deliver the horses, was in
either case a failure to perform an obligation of the contract of sale. That this
failure is a good defense between the original parties is not questioned; that it is a
good defense as to the assignee is evident
from the following cases: In Iron City N.
Bank v. McCord, 139 Pa. 52, an action was
brought by the indorsee and holder against
the drawer of an order, which order the
payee and indorser had obtained from the
defendant in payment of the balance
claimed to be due him as contractor for
the erection of buildings upon the contractor's assurance that all labor and material claims were paid, and no liens could
be filed against the buildings. This assurance proved untrue, and the defendant
was compelled to pay a mechanics' lien.
The court held that the drawer had a good
defense against the payee, and that, since
the order was not negotiable, the same
defense would prevail against the indorsee.
In Wetter v. Kiley, 95 Pa. 461, the defendant made his note expressly for the
accommodation of the payee, by whom it
was assigned for value to the bank; the
payee bad promised the maker that he
would take care of this paper when the
note come due; the note proved to be a
non-negotiable paper. The court charged,
inter alia: "You will remember that the
equity lies chiefly in this agreement that
Wetter (payee) would see that the note
was paid or protected. The bank would
take the first note subject to that agreement, and the defendant could plead it
against Wetter, and could plead it against
the bank." This extreme case goes to
illustrate how rigorously the courts have
applied the principle that the assignee of
a chose in action, not negotiable, takes
subject to all the defenses to which it was
subject in the hands of the assignor. In
Faull v. Tinsman,'86 Pa. 108, the court
held that a contemporaneous agreement
was a defense which would have availed
the maker in a suit brought by the assignee as well as in a suit by the payee.
The demurrer is therefore sustained, and
judgment entered for the defendant.

WARPnEw L. SHwatAN, J.
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CHARLES METZLER AND JOHN
METZLER vs. JOHN METZLER.
Decedents' Estates-Paynentof legacyEvidence of death of a devisee under
will-In re Afetzler's Estate.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John
iMetzler, who died in 1899, gave by
will his farm to his son William, whom
he made executor.
He also gave $1,000 to his son Jacob,
"which," said the testator, "I require my
soi William to pay out of his farm heretofore devised to him. If Jacob should never
appear to demand the money, then it shall
be paid to his twosons, Charles andHenry.
Jacob had gone to Texas in 1887. Charles
and Henry petitioned the Orphans' Court
to compel William to pay them each $500.
The Court appointed an auditor, who
found that Jacob was heard from by letter
in 1888 addressed to his father, and again
in 1889, but a witness had testified that he
had heard a member of the family say that
he, Jacob, had never been heard from or of
since.
There was no other evidence on the
subject.
Defendant urged:
1. The remedy was not the proper one.
2. Evidence of death of Jacob was insufficient.
3. Defendant was not personally liable.
ALEXANDER and ADAMSON for plaintiff.
1. The remedy torecovera testamentary
charge upon laud is exclusively in the
Orphans' Court since the Act of April 28,
1834. 1 P. &,L. 1514; Walters' Appeal, 95
Pa. 305; Price v. Livingston, 80 Pa. 99.
2. The defendant is personally liable.
Mohler's Appeal, 8 Pa. 26; Etler v. Greenawalt, 98 Pa. 422-431.
3. The evidence of the death of Jacob
was sufficient.-Whiteside's Appeal, 23 Pa.
116; Shoneman's Appeal, 174 Pa. 1; Appeal
of Esterly, 109 Pa. 223.
BASEHORE and BARU for defendant.
1. The legacy is a charge upon the land.
Brandt's Appeal, 8 Watts 198; DeWitt v.
4W. & S. 414.
2. The Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction to enforce personal responsibility in
regard to a testamentary charge upon
land unless it appear that the land is insufficient to- satisfy the claim.-Mohler's
Appeal, 8 Pa. 30; Hoover v. Hoover, 5
Barr 351; Strickler v. Sheaffer, 5 Barr 240.
The jurisdiction of this case is exclusively

i 1 the Connmon Pleas.-Dinsinore v. Ranisey, 2 D. R. 659; Headley v. Rennes, 129
Pa. 542.
3. (a) Jacob's last domicile wasin Texas.
Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466; Carey's
Appeal. 75 Pa. 201.
(b) To create a presumption of death,
absence from last domicilemust be shown.
Williams' Estate, 8 W. N. C. 310..
OPINION OF THE COURT.

1. That the devisee of land charged with a
legacy is personally liable, cannot be questioned, Hoover v. Hoover, 5 Barr 351;
Mohler's Appeal, 8 Pa. 26. But it does
not appear to have been settled whether
or not his personal liability is propdrly
enforceable by proceedings in the Orphans'
Court.
Under the act of Feoruary 24, 1834, P. L.
70 &59, it has been determined that the
Orphans Court has exclusive jurisdiction
to enforce testamentary charges on land
when the proceedings are against the land
itself, Strickler v. Sheaffer, 5 Pa. 240;
Dinsmore v. Ramsey, 13 Pa. C. C. 119. It
has also been decided that the Common
Pleas has jurisdiction to enforce the personal liability of the devisee. Headley v.
Renner, 129 Pa. 542. Whether such jurisdiction of the Common Pleas is exclusive,
however, or merely concurrent with that
of the Orphans' Court does not appear to
have been definitely (:etermined. In Eyre's
appeal, 106 Pa. 184, the question was suggested by the court, but was left undecided
because it had not been presented upon the
argument.
The language of the act,-that the Orphans' Court may "make such decree or
order touching the payment of the legacy,
out of the real estate, as may be requisite
and just," would, if narrowly construed,
support the view that the decree may not
fix a personal liability. But in Mohler's
Appeal, 8 Pa. 26, the court declared that
a narrow construction would be contrary
to the whole scope of the act, which is
remedial in its nature, and designed to
give to the Orphans' Court every power in
relation to the premises which a court of
equity would have. In view of this declaration, we think that in the case at bar, a
decree against William Metzler personally,
should not be denied upon jurisdictional
grounds.
2. It is urged that the evidence of the
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death of Jacob Metzler is insufficient, because-it does not appear that he was absent
for seven years from his Texas domicile.
It is true that the,absence must be from
the last known domicile or place of residence. Willis Est. 8 W. N. C. 310; Francis
v. Francis. 180 Pa. 646. But in the case at
bar it is not shown that Jacob ever had a
domicile or place of residence in Texas, or
even that he went there with a purpose of
acquiring a domicile or fixed place of residence. It is tiue that the evidence that
he had not been heard from by his family
for seven years might have been stronger,
if a member of the family had so testified.
But we think the testimony of the friend
or neighbor was sufficient to establish a
primafacie case, and it does not seem to
have been contradicted. Whiteside's Appeal, 23 Pa. 114.
Decree for Petitioners.
JOHN HOME vs. WM. WALKER.
jectment by bill in equity-Specific p2e?for'mance of parol contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Home and Walker each owned a farm
in Cumberland county, the former a farm
of 64 acres, the latter one of 95 acres.- The
64-acre was worth $4,000, and the other
$6,500. They orally agreed to exchange,
Home promising to pay Walker $2,500.
Walker took possession of Home's farm
three weeks after the bargain was made,
but when Home, six weeks subsequently,
attempted to take possession of Walker's,
Walker resented him. Home then formally tendered $2,500, with interest from
date of the contract. Walker declining to
accept it, and continuing in sole possession,
Home brings this ejectment for the Walker
tract. Walker, after taking possession of
Home's farm, tore down the buildings and
cut it into building lots, with a view to
sale, the land having been recently annexed to the borough of Carlisle.
JOHNSON and

INNoH for the plaintiff.

1. In Pennsylvania an action in ejectineut is a substitute for a bill in equity.
Ebenly v. Lehman, 100 Pa. 542; Peebles
v. Reading, 8 S. & R. 484; Pederman v.
Huling, 31 Pa. 432.
2. Equity will decree specific performance of a parol contract for the exchange

of lands -when the agreement is carried
out in whole or in part or when the parties
cannot be placed in statu quo. Johnson v.
Johnson, 6Watts 360; 4W. & S. 27; Scbeny
v. Schaefer, 130 Pa. 16.
KENNEDY and MCINTIRE for defendant.
1. An agreement for the exchange of
lands is within the statute of frauds and
must be in writing. Rice v. Peet, 15 Johns
503; Johnson v. Johnson, 6 Watts 371.
2. There is no difference between a parol
sale and an exchange of lands as to the
requisites to take them out of the statute
of frauds, and in an exchange possession
must be established as to both parties.
Moss v. Culver, 64 Pa. 424.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Home, the plaintiff, seeks to recover
from Walker a tract of land. He bases his
right to do so upon an agreement entered
into between them for the exchange of
farms. This agreement was an oral one.
It was not in writing and signed by Walker, as prescribed by the Statute of Frauds
and Perjuries, approved the 21st of March,
1772.
While it is true that Walker has taken
possession of the land of Home, it must be
kept in view that it is the possession of
the land of Walker which he seeks to
obtain in this action. The bad faith of
Walker or what redress Home may have
on account of the same against him is not
the matter before us for consideration.
Nothing has been done by the plaintiff
to take the case out of the statute referred
to. While the act of Walker in taking
possession of his, Home's, land, might be
regarded as a part payment of the purchase
money by the latter, yet no valuable improvements were made on the land agreed
to be conveyed to him. Possession of the
same was not even given him. Indeed, it
is to secure this that this action has been
brought. Part payment of the purchase
money does not take the case out of the
statute. Hill v. Myers, 43 Pa. 172; Newcumet v. Clark, 10 Phila. 127.
"There is no difference between a parol
sale and an exchange of lands, as to the
requisites as to take them out of the Statute of Frauds. In both the fact of possession taken is requisite. Although, if possession of one of the subjects of the exchange is shown by clear and unequivocal
evidence, it will not require such clear
and convincing evidence to establish pos-
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session'of the other." Moss v. Culver, 64
Pa. 424.
It is not pretended in this case that possession of the Walker tract, as already
stated, was had by Home. The adjudications are most numerous and unquestioned
that "exclusive, continued and notorious
possession, subsequent to or contemporaneous with the contract is an indispensable ingredient in an action for specific
performance of a parol contract for the
sale of land."
In the case of Sheuy v. Scheaffer, 130
Pa. 16, cited and relied upon by plaintiff,
the purchase money had been paid in part,
possession taken and kept for fourteen
years, and yaluable improvements made
thereon.
We therefore conclude that the plaintiff
is not entitled to maintain his action of
ejectment under the statement of facts
agreed upon and judgment is entered
in favor of the defendant.
WILLIAM VINTON vs. BOROUGH
OF NEWTON.
Boroughs-Laying out of parks-Abandonment of parks by boroughs.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

By an ordinance passed Jan. 1, 1899, the
council of the borough of Newton ordered
the purchase of a tract of land containing
600 acres within the Borough limits for
Park purposes. Commissioners were appointed to locate and survey the same.
This they did and the Park was laid out
and paid for. Subsequently taxes were
levied and paid for improvements. On
Jan. 1, 1900, an ordinance was passed by
which the Park was abandoned and it was
ordered that it be divided into lots and
sold.
William Vinton is owner of a lot facing
the Park, and has been for twenty years.
He now files a bill to restrain the Borough
from so doing, claiming that the park was
a dedication to the public and its abandonment would work great damage to the
complainant.
RHODES, F. and CHAS. A. PIPER for
plaintiff.
1. Property dedicated to the public is
vested in the grantor for the use of the
public, 14 Pa. 186; 31 W. S. 429.

2. A dedication to the public cannot be
revoked or the dedicated property sold by
the grantor unless the property is abandoned by the public for such purposes as
dedicated; 7 W. & S. 104; 14 Pa. 186; 96 Vt.
716.
JAs. N. LIGHTNER and RHODES, J. for
defendant.
1. The plaintiff is not materially damaged, being left in the same position as
before the park was laid out.
2. A borough is given the power by the
Legislature to abandon roads and public
thoroughfares when they deem it necessary. Paul v. Carver, 24 Pa. 207; McGee's
Appeal, 114 Pa. 470.
3. When a borough has cause to use
this power delegated to such borough by
the state, it has been held that the act is
constitutional and within the scope of the
borough's authority.
McGee's* Appeal,
114 Pa. 470.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The second proviso of the third paragraph of the 27th section of the Act of
April 3rd, 1851, declares that "every jury
appointed to view, review, lay out, widen,
or straighten, or vacate any road or part
of a road, shall have due reference to the
town plot, and to the general arrangement,
plan, convenience and advantage of the
borough." The obvious inference is that
a borough has the power to vacate streets,
as well as to lay them out. Trickett on
Borough Law, Vol. 1, p. 380. And it is
held that to vacate a street is not a taking,
an injury, or a destruction of property,
within the meaning of the Constitution,
and therefore that the borough need not
provide for compensation to adjacent
property owners. McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa.
470; Paul v. Carver, 24 Pa. 207.
It would seem to be just as essential that
a borough have power to abandon its Parks
as to vacate its streets, for the expansion
of the borough might be in such a direction
as to make a park practically useless. But
the legislature does not seem to have provided for such a contingency, and we are
satisfied that the right does not exist in the
absence of statutory authority. The question was presented t6r the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Davenport v. Buffington, 97 Fed. Rep. 234,
and it was there unanimously determined
that a nation, state or municipality, which
dedicates land to public use for the purpose
of a park is estopped from revoking that
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dedication, selling the park or appropriating it to other purposes, and that a resident
tax payer, who is one of the cestuis que se
for whom a park dedicated to the use of
the public, is held in trust, has an interest
in the park sufficient to enable him to
maintain a suit in equity to prevent the
diversion of the park to private uses.
In the case at bar, there can be no doubt
that the park had been dedicated to the
public use. The park had been laid out
and paid for, and taxes had been levied for
the purpose of making improvements. It
is true that the proximity of the park was
not an inducement to the purchase, by the
complainant, of his lot of land, he having
owned the lot before the park was purchased by the borough. But as a tax payer
of the borough, he has paid money for the
improvement of the park, and moreover
his property would suffer particular damage by its abandonment.
The Decree enjoining the defendant is
affirmed.

AMOS CLARKE AND GEO. CLARKE
BY

HiS FATHER

AND

NEXT

FRIEND,

A3tos CLARKE vs. JOHN HOGAN.
Personalinjuries-Contributorynegligence
-Ordinance-Excessive damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

George Clarke, while riding a bicycle on
a,,street in Carlisle, collided with an ice
wagon of John Hogan, was thrown off and
his leg was broken. Action was brought,
both by the father and himself, the jury
rendering a verdict of $1000 for father and
$1000 for the boy. The ordinance of the
borough requires all vehicles to keep to the
right side of the street. This wagon was
on the east side of the street going southward about two feet being between the
east side of the wagon and the curbstone.
The boy, 14 years old, was riding northward, and he for some reason preferred going between the wagon and the curb. This
he could have done successfully had Hogan, as the boy expected, turned his vehicle
a little to the west. This Hogan failed to
do, and after the horses the bicycle struck
against the front wheel of the wagon.

H-ss and EDWARDS for appellant and

defendant below.
1. Plaintiff contributed to injury: (1.)
By violating law of road; Grier v. Sampson, 27 Pa. 103; Taylor v. Traction Co.,184
(2.) By taking unnecessary
Pa. 467.
chances. Hall v. Tionesta, 146 Pa. 11;
Mueller v. Twp, 152 Pa. 399.
2. Damages are excessive in both cases:
Childs v. R. R. 27 W. N. 510; Iron Co. v.
Rupp, 100 Pa. 99.
ELMES and HENDERSON for plaintiff
and appellee.
The ordinance was reasonable. Foote v.
Product Co., 195 Pa. 190. The boy was on
the right side of the road, hence notguilty
of contributory negligence. Footev. Product Co., Supra. The Supreme court will
not reverse for excessive damages if jury
acted under proper instructions. R. R.
v. Fielding, 48 Pa. 321 ; Cussey v. R. R.,
75 Pa. 83. The discretion ofjury properly
instructed is measure of damages. R. R.
v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. 282.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question of negligence, as this court
has frequently had occasion to declare, is
generally a question for thejury. Itis only
when there is no reasonable doubt asto the
facts, or as to thej ust inferences to be drawn
therefrom, that the question may properly
be passed upon by the court, McKee v.
Bidewell, 74 Pa. 218; Baker v. Felio, 97 Pa.
70.: The judgment in the case at bar must
therefore remain undisturbed, unless the
jury was manifestly in error in deciding
that the defendant was guilty of negligence
and that the plaintiff, George Clarke, was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
Under the Act of April 23, 1889, the
plaintiff had the same rights as a person
riding in a carriage drawn by horses. In
riding northward on the east side of the
street, he was where he had a right to be
and where the ordinance required him to
be, while the driver of the ice wagon, in
driving southward on the east side of the
street was on the wrong side of the thoroughfare. Moreover, the driver failed to
give way in time for Clarke to pass between
him and the curb. It is true that the circumstances may have justified Hogan in
being temporarily on the left side, and
perhaps it was impossible for him to avoid
the collision. But such inferences are not
supported by the evidence, and the jury
having found that he was in the wrong,
we certainly cannot say their finding was
erroneous.
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Again, it might have been the part of
wisdom, under the circumstances, for
Clarke to have passed Hogan on the left
instead of on the right, but the jury has
declared that he was not negligent in
attempting to pass on the right, and even
if we differed from that conclusion, we
could hardly say that the conclusion was
manifestly unreasonable.
The contention that Clark had no choice,
but was under a duty to turn to the left,
and had no right to expect Hogan to give
way to him, is not supported by authority.
The recognized rule is that a footman or
horseman has no right to force a heavily
laden wagon out of the beaten track of a
highway. Beach v. Parmeter, 23 Pa. 196.
This rule may extend to a wheelman. But
when the beaten track is broad enough
for both vehicles, as in the case of an ordinary borough street, and when an ordinance requires vehicles of all kinds to keep
to the right, we do not believe that the
duty of giving way rests solely upon the
driver of the lighter vehicle.
There is no evidence on the records that
the verdict of the jury was excessive, and
we must assume that $1000 for the father
and a like sum for the son is but reasonable compensation. Clearly, we cannot say
that it is manifestly unreasonable, for there
are many cases of broken limbs in which
much larger verdicts have been sustained.
Judgment affirmed with costs.

I-

BE. JOHN HOPPER'S ESTATE.
Liability of trustee under will.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hopper by will devised his real and personal property to his son, Joseph, in trust,
as to one-third for himself, as to one-third
for his daughter, Sarah, and as to onethird for his son, William. With respect
to William, the words of the will were:
"In trust, as to another one-third, to collect the. rents, income, dividends and
profits, and from time to time pay out so
much thereof as he may deem best to the
support of my son, William, and his family
during his life, and after his death to pay
out the balance of income not expended
by him, and the principal of the personal
estate, and to convey the real estate to the
children of the said William, their heirs

and assigns. In no case shall my son,
Joseph, be accountable for the manner in
which in his discretion he shall have expended the income of the estate, nor for
his having sold or converted any of the
principal or real estate which I hereby
authorize him to do." William, a poor
business man, went into business ventures,
which proved unsuccessful, and contracted
debts therein of $1,495, which Joseph paid.
Joseph also bought a home for William,
paying $3,000 for it. He gave to William
for his support $1,800 a year. The consequence was that during the eleven years
of William's life after the creation of the
trust, the whole income, averaging $2,600,
was expended, and that stooks worth
$1,500 were converted and the price consumed, and a piece of land was sold subject to the trust, one-third of the price of
which was $2,000. This price was also
consumed. William dying, his widow
administratrix excepted to credits for
these expenditures, and to the diminution
of the surplus of the estate.
HARPEL and KOSTENBAUDER for plaintiff.
1. A trustee, though vested with discretion, cannot flagrantly misapply funds.
Naglee's Estate, 52 Pa. 154; Jones' Appeal, 8 W. & S. 142; Babbitt v. Babbitt,
26 N. J. Eq. 44.
2. Honest intentions will not protect a
trustee who departs from the rule of prudence. Com. v. McAllister, 28 Pa. 480.
HOLCOMB and MACCONVELL for defendant.
1. When a trustee is given discretionary
powers, the court will not interfere. Vanderveer's Estate, 16 W. N. C. 259; Naglee's Estate, 52 Pa. 154.
2. A trustee is not required to be infallible, but only to exercise ordinary prudence
and skill. Cridland's Estate, 132 Pa. 479.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Under the provisions of the will of John
Hopper, the trustee named therein was
empowered to expend so much of the income of the share of his son, William, as
" he might deem best for the support" of
the latter. But it was made obligatory
upon him, upon the decease of William,
to pay to the children of the latter any
unexpended portion of the income "and
the principal of the personal estate, and
to convey to them the real estate." There
was to be no accountability for the expenditure of the income, "nor for his hay-

THE FORUM
ing sold or converted any of the principal
or real estate," which he was authorized
to do by the will of the testator.
While he was thus not to be held responsible for mistakes of judgment in
making a disposition of the same, he had
no authority to make a gift of the proceeds to his cestui que trust, nor apply it
to discharge his debts or promote his comfort. He could not Jawfully pay his pecuniary liabilities out of the corpus of the
fund. He might sell the real estate, and
reinvest the proceeds in other property,
and as he had the power to pay over the
income of all the trust property to William, he would incur no liability by permitting William to occupy the real estate
devised by the testator, or to reside upon
real estate which he purchased out of the
proceeds of the sales made by him. His
duty under the will was to hand over to
the children of William, upon the death
of the latter, the estate devised in trust
without impairment.
The fact that he allowed William $1,800
annually for his support cannot be complained of, nor that heexpended the whole
of the income, amounting annually to
$2,600. It was within his discretion to do
so. He was not inhibited from paying
debts contracted by William, if the income of the estate was alone devoted to
this. But he had no authority to expend
$1,500 worth of stocks, nor to sell or expend for his brother's benefit $2,000 of the
real estate. He should therefore account
to the children of William for these sums,
aggregating $3,600, and to this extent the
exceptions to the account are sustained.
If, however, William was merely permitted to occupy the home for which
$2,000 was paid, and it remains as a part
of the trust estate unincumbered, then
this can be conveyed to the children of
William, and the surcharge of the trustee
would be for $500.
It is true, as was contended for on part
of the accountant, Joseph Hopper, that a
trustee is not expected to be infallible,
and that only common skill and prudence
are demanded of him, as held in Cridland's
Estate, 113 Pa. 479, and numerous other
cases. Yet, where the powers and duties
of a trustee are clear and defined, as in the
present case, he cannot excuse a conver-

sion and misappropriation of the trust
fund on the ground that he acted in good
faith, and according to his best judgment.
Com. v. McAllister, 28 Pa. 480.
His duty to the children of his brother,
William, was to keep intact the estate intrusted to him, and deliver the same over
to them. While the exceptant in this
case was the administratrix of William,
and, as such, may have no standing to
complain, yet the exceptions may be
treated as made in behalf of the children.
ESTATE OF ROBERT STOCKDALE.
Decedents' estates-Distributionof intestate-Assignment of curtesy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Robert Stockdale died in Allen township, Washington county, iennsylvania,
in 1882, intestate, leaving to survive him
a widow, Dorcas, eight children and the
children of a deceased son, Allen Stockdale, who had died in 1875, namely, Dora
Stockdale and Margaret Stockdale.
At the time of his death the said Robert
Stockdale owned real estate to the value
of about $30,000. His widow elected to
hold one-third of the real estate, which
was set apart to her in 1876 by a mutual
agreement between her and the heirs dur
ing her life., The other real estate was
sold and the proceeds distributed among
the heirs.
In 1883 Dora Stockdale married one
Cook McCain. In 1890 she died intestate
and without issue.
In 1891 Margaret Stockdale assigned all
her interest, as heir at law of the estate of
Dora (Stockdale) McCain to her mother,
Mrs. H. M. Stockdale.
In May, 1899, Dorcas Stockdale, the
widow of Robert Stockdale, died.
Cook McCain, the surviving husband of
Dora (Stockdale) McCain, brings action
to recover the one-eighteenth of the dower
interest, $10,000, now being distributed,
the real estate having been sold. Can he
recover? If so, can he recover it absolutely,
or does he hold it for his life only?
Guy THORNE and A. C. McINTYRE for
plaintiff.
1. The estate is to be divided per striies
when there are living children, as well as
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when there are deceased children, but
having living issue to represent3 them and
not per capita. Baskin's App. Barr, 307.
2. The husband is entitled to the wife's
share. Eberts v. Eberts, 55 Pa. 118.
3. The interest of the husband after
partition proceeding of real estate, of which
his deceased wife is one of the heirs, is real
estate. Detler v. Young, 2 Yates 265.
P. LONERGEN and F. RHODES for defendant.
1. The seizen of the wife must be an
actual one to entitle the husband to curtesy
in her lands. Young v. McIntyre, 6 W.
N. C. 252.
2. The husband cannot be tenant by the
curtesy of the wife's estate in reversion or
remainder unless the particular estate be
ended during coverture. Comper v. Baker,
71 Pa. 476; Hilner v. Age, 23 Pa. 305.
3. No curtesy in remainder or reversion
after an estate of freehold. Hilner v. Age,
23 Pa. 305.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The real estate set apart to Dorcas Stockdale, the widow of Robert Stockdale, remained in her possession until the time of
her decease in the year 1899.
The granddaughter of said Robert Stockdale intermarried with Cook McCain, died
in 1890. She never had actual seisin or
possession of the real estate 'which had
been set apart to her grandmother. When
she died, her husband, under the laws of
Pennsylvania, did not become entitled to
an estate in them as tenant by the curtesy.
Hitner v. Ege, 23 Pa. 305;- Williams v.
Baker, 71 Pa. 483; Young v. McIntire, 2
W. N. C. 252; Young v. Lynch, 6 Dist.
Rep. 348.
The plaintiff is therefore not entitled to
recover. The contention of the plaintiff
that when real estate is sold under the
direction of the Orphans' Court, the purchase money is to be substituted for the
real estate as to its enjoyment, is correct,
but in the present case, as the plaintiff is
not entitled to any estate in the realty, it
follows that he can have none in the proceeds of the purchase money derived from
the sale of the same.
Judgment is directed to be entered in
favor of the defendants.

JOHN HANN vs. CUMBERLAND
VALLEY R. R. CO.
Bight to recover for fright occasioned by
negligence.
STATEMENT

OF THE CASE.

Hann was riding in a coach of the defendant on May 3, 1898, when a collision
occurred between the train of which it was
a part and another train. Hannwasnot externally hurt in any way but suffered
a severe mental shock of terror, the
result of which was "traumatic neurasthenia," which lasted several months
and disabled him entirely from working. He has suffered already damages to the amount of $1500, and his
earning power will be for the future
so diminished that another $1500 would
not be an unreasonable compensation
therefor. Demurrer to plaintiff's declaration.
KERN and MOON for plaintiff.
Fright and mental suffering as an element in negligence cases, constitute a good
cause of action. Ritch v. Sanderson, 2
Forum 35; Township v. Montgomery; 95
Pa. 444; Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. 290 ;
Pittsburg R. R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306.
KLINE and NIcHOLS for defendant..

There can be no recovery for negligence
without proof of damage, and mere fright
is not such damage as will support the
action. Ewing v. R. R. Co., 147 Pa. 40;
Tryson v. R. R. Co., 70 Mo. 1&3; Spade v.
R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285; Canning v.
Williamston, 1 Cush 451; Fox v. Barkey,
126 Pa. 164.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff, who was a passenger on
the railway of the defendant, by reason of
a collision of trains suffered a nervous
shock which resulted in "traumatic neurasthenia" and his complete disablement.
The question presented is whether there
can be recovery for the results of a fright
and the defendant for whom recovery is
sought has not acted tortuously.
In Spade v. Lynn & Boston iR. R., 166
Mass. 290; the Court said: "We remain
satisfied with the rule that there can be
recovery for fright; terror, alarm, anxiety
or distress of mind,if they are accompanied
by some physical injury, and if this rule
is to stand, we think it should also be held
that there can be no recovery for such
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physical injuries as may be caused solely
by such mental disturbances where there
is no injury to the person from without."
It was declared in Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry. C., 151 N.Y.108: "If no recovery can
be had for fright, then none can be had
for the injuries resulting therefrom. That
the result may be nervous disease,blindness
or insanity in no way changes the principle. * * * To establish such a doctrine,

would be contrary to the principles of
public policy. * * * It would open a wide

field for fictitious or speculative claims.
The damages are too remote to justify a
recovery. The plaintiff's injury does not
fall within the rule as to proximate damages."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Ewing v. Railway Co., 147 Pa. 44, stated
that "We know of no well considered case
in which it has been held that mere fright
accompanied by some injury to the person
has been actionable."
The cases relied, on by the plaintiff do
not conflict with these determinations.
In Buchanan v. R. R. C., 52 N.J.L. 265,
the Court says that "the suit was not on
the single ground that the plaintiff was
frightened."
While in Warren v. R. R. Co., 163 Mass.
484, the Court in discussing the case expressly holds that "for mere fright or risk,
the law allows no recovery."
The decision in the case of Rich v.
Sanders, 2 Forum 35, was based on the
recklessness of the defendant from which
an intent to cause a mental disturbance
might be reasonably inferred.
A compulsory non-suit is, therefore, directed in this case.
MARY THOMPSON vs. JNO. THOMPSON.
Alienation of husband's affeetions-Jastification of advice as defense-Advice of
parents.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Mary and Philip Thompson were married, against the wishes of John Thompson, father of Philip, on June 17, 1898; and
lived together as husband and wife for
thirteen months. During all this time
John never became reconciled to the marriage, but by constant representation that

Mary was untidy, ignorant and unworthy
to be his wife, and so at length persuaded
his son to abandon her. Philip had a
steady income as clerk of $1,800 a year,
was quiet and kind, and Mary was deeply
attached to him. In all probability, blit
for the importunate interference of the
defendant, they would have lived happily
together for life. This is an action of
trespass for enticing her husband away
from her. Plaintiff claims damages for
the loss of her husband's support, and for
the loss of his society, sympathy and affection.
GRAUL and DRUMHELLER for plaintiff.
1. Married woman may maintain action,
in her own name, for personal injuries.
Gerned v. Gerned, 185 Pa. 235; Carrv.
Easton City, 142 Pa. 139.
2. A father who wrongfully induces a
son to abandon his wife is liable in damages to the wife. Tasker v. Stanley, 153
Mass. 148; Gerned v. Gerned, 185 Pa. 235.
FRANK and DETRICm for defendant.
I. Father had right to advise son as he
did, if advice given in good faith. Hutchinson v. Peck, 5 John. 196; Gerned v.
Gerned, 185 Pa. 235.
2. Good faith is presumed until plaintiff
proves otherwise. Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich.
371.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

That a wife may maintain an action for
the alienation of her husband's affections
and the deprivation of his society and
support, is well settled by the decisions of
the appellate tribunals of many states, including that ofourown. Gernedv. Gerned,
185 Pa. 235; Haynes v. Newlin, 14 L. R.
A. 787.
The courts, however, recognizing the
reciprocal obligations of parent and child,
and the duty of discharging these obligations, have uniformly held that to render
a parent liable for inducinga son or daughter to separate from a wife or husband, the
burden is put upon the party seeking to
recover to show a clear case of want of
justification on part of the parent.
The parent is presumed to act in good
faith, and for what is honestly believed to
be for the best interests of the child.
In the statement filed in this case, it is
not alleged, nor does it appear, that John
Thompson acted from malevolent or dishonest motives. It is not averred that
his statements as to the habits of the
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plaintiff, nor as to her mental capacity or
training, were untrue, nor that his persuasions to his son to abandon the plaintiff
were not made in the belief that he was
advising his son for what he believed to
be for the best interests of the latter, and
in the belief that. the abandonment of the
plaintiff by his son would be promotive of
his best interests. If the statements made
to the husband be true, and the advice to
abandon her was honestly given, then
there can be no recovery, and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to negative the
presumption of his intent being the welfare of his son.
As already stated, .this does not appear
in the statement of the plaintiff, and the
duty of the court is to hold, as a matter of
law, that it does not appear that she has
suffered any injury for which redress can
be afforded. Gerned v. Gerned, 185 Pa.
235; Tasker v. Tasker, 10 L. R. A. 468;
Tucker v. Tucker, 32 L. R. A. 623.

JOHN HARPER vs. GOOD HOPE
SOCIETY.
Beneficial societies-ecoverq of benefitsArrearages.
STATEM ENT OF THE CASE.

The society was a beneficial one, paying
$2.00 a week to sick members, and $25.00
for funeral expenses at death. The members paid ten cents weekly. A by-law
suspended every member who failed to
pay the weekly dues for two days after
they became payable, and declared that
on the lapse of a month without payment
of dues the member should, without action
of the society, cease to be a member. It
did not, however, enforce this rule in every
case, except one, which occurred three
years before, treating a delinquent as a
full member as soon as he paid up the
back dues. It had done this on the average in twenty cases per year for three
years. The number of its members was
100. Harper himself had on five occasions
failed to pay his dues in time; once for
two weeks, once for ten days, once for a
week, and once for four weeks. In every
case, on his tendering the back dues, they

were received, and lie was, without formal
action, treated as in full membership, and
his dues becoming payable afterwards
were received when he tendered them.
On August 17, 1899, he failed to pay his
dues then becoming payable. He committed default the next four weeks. He
then tendered the dues of five weeks, with
interest. The treasurer declined to receive
them, saying he would consult the members. The same day Harper became sick,
and so continued for two months. This
is assuipsit against the society for the
sick benefit of $2.00 per week.
GRAuL and KOSTED, BAUDER for plaintiff.
1. The by-law of the society, providing
that a member should be dropped without
action of the society as a body, is invalid,
and will not subject that member to forfeiture of his benefits. Com. vs. Pa. Beneficial Institute, 2 S. & R. 141; Ludowiski
v. Polish Roman Catholic Society, 29 Mo.
337; Sibley v. Cartaret Club, 4 N. J. L.
295.
2. Where a party does any act inconsistent with the suppositions that ne continues to hold the other strictly to the
agreement, he is to be taken to have
waived it altogether. Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, vol. 28 page 550.
3. Acceptance of arrearages, the most
usual way of working, a waiver of forfeiture. Rice v. N. Eng. Mut. Aid Soc.,
146 Mass. 248; Gaige v. Grand Lodge, 48
Hun. 137; Lasher v. N. Western Nat.
Ins. Co., 55 How. 318; Hunstead v.
Wash. Fire Ins. Co., 8 Phila. 331.
FRANI( and KATz for defendant.

1. The contract of membership includes
the constitution and by-laws, and all
members are bound to take notice as to
what they contain. Susq. Inp. Co. v.
Peirce, 7 W. & S. 348; Mitchell v. Lycoming Mut. Ins. Co., 51 Pa. 402; 58 Pa. 433.
2. In an action for benefits it is not
competent evidence that it was customary
to reinstate defaulting members of the
beneficial association up-rn payment of
their dues. Dickinson v. A. 0. U. W., 159
Pa. 258; Phillips v. A. C. Society, 6 Sup.
Ct. 157.
3. Where the rights to benefits is conditioned on the payment of assessments, a
failure to pay such assessments is a forfeiture of the benefits. Ins. Co. v. Birnbaum, 116 Pa. 565.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the cause at bar Harper had for five
weeks failed to pay his dues as a member
of the Good Hope Society, and, according
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to its by-laws, thereby became ipsofacto
expelled, they being such that if any
member "failed to pay the weekly assessments two days after they fell due he
should be suspended," and if he failed to
pay them at the end of four weeks he
should, "without action of the society,"
be expelled. Harper tendered payment
after a lapse of five weeks, with Interest,
when payment was refused. He then became sick, and now, after two months, he
such for sick benefits at $2.00 per week.
He had four times before been in arrears,
but each time had been reinstated upon
payment of amount due.
There is no contention that the by-laws
ar unreasonable in their terms, the
counsel for tbe plaintiff admitting that
sudh by-laws were proper, and conduced
to the ittainment of the end for which
beneficial organizations of this nature are
instituted. It is conclusively established
as law, in Rhule v. Accidental Fund, 13
Sup. Ct. 417, that such a regulation as will
permit the expulsion of a member without
notice for arrearages is not unreasonable.
This must be permitted, or a considerable
expenditure of beneficial funds and of personal attention would take place, in order
that a delinquent, whose continued deficits makes his membership undesirable,
might be given a chance of reinstatement.
It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff
that a by-law expelling a peron without
either notice or trial is invalid, and they
cite Com.v. Pa. Ben. Ins. Co., 2 S. & R. 147,
to sustain their contention. A superficial
glance at this case would seem to indicate
that this was authority for such a statement, but in that case the by-laws indicated that a trial was necessary, while in
the cause at bar the regulation is that they
are to be expelled "without action." For
this reason we must rule this point in
favor of the defendant.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff has
ably argued that acceptance of arrearages
constitute evidence of waiver, and that
such evidence should be sent to the jury,
it being their province to determine
whether or not, as a matter of fact, a
waiver of the right to expel without action
was effectuated. In this he was right, as
the court has decided. Sweetser v. Odd
Fellows' Soc., 117 Ind. 97.

It must legitimately follow, if we grant
this premise, that the question as to
whether one is a beneficiary or not is also
within the province of the jury as a matter of fact. Jacobs v. Balt. Mut., 9 Sup.
Ct. 99; Stidle v. Twin City, 8 Sup. Ct. 178.
The counsel further argue that acceptance of arrearages is the most usual way
of effecting a waiver of right to expel, and
in this again we agree-Hunstead v.
Wash. Ins. Co., 8 Phila. 331; Rice v. N.
Eng. Mut. Aid Soc., 146 Mass. 248; but
we are unable to see how this can affect
the case at bar. The arrearages here have
not been paid, have never been accepted,
and were never tendered, even, within
the time allowed by the by-laws. How,
then, can it be said that there was a waiver
of this particular breach? Had there been
evidence that a tender had been made in
time, or that arrearages had been accepted
after time when he should have been expelled, -we would have felt constrained to
send the cause to the jury, to ascertain
as a matter of fact whether the by-laws
were waived, and whether Harper was not
a beneficiary still, but since there was no
such evidence, we think it is a matter of
law, and for the court to decide.
The plaintiff's counsel argue that it is
unjust, after the treasurer had so many
times accepted his arrearages, he being
supposedly thereby reinstated, thus leading him to believe it would be done again,
to refuse now to accept the dues, and thus
cause him to suffer loss. It is poor logic
for a person to argue that, because he had
been forgiven delinquencies many times
before, he should be forgiven for all which
he might afterwards commit. The mere
waiver of right to expel heretofore does
not operate to make the by-law unenforceable, and the evidence referring to prior
acceptance of payment is ruled out as
irrelevant to adjust the equities or determine the comparative rights of the respective parties. Dickinson v. A. 0. U.
W., 159 Pa. 258; Phillips v. Aid Society,
6 Sup. Ct. 157.
Harper, in becoming a member, bound
himself to obey all the rules and regulations of the society, which were made for
the mutual benefit of the members, and
we vill sustain all reasonable regulations.
He has violated them, not once, but many
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times, till righteously indignant, the association refuses longer to consider him a
member. It may work a hardship if he
thought the by-law waived, but he must
not be lulled into fancied security when
he knows it is contrary to his oath and to
t lie best interests of his brother-members.
One principle of law must govern all analogous cases, and the principle governing
here has been laid down in Rhule v. Aid
Fund, before cited, to be that one must
pay his dues, and his failure to know when
in arrears is at his own peril. He has here
further failed or willfully waited, and we
are of the opinion that he may not recover. We therefore declare this case nonsuited.

Huss, J.
ARTHUR NORMAN, ASSIGNEE,
TRADERS' FIRE INSURANCE CO.

VS.

Action to recover on an insurancepolicyDelay-Assignmcnt of property.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. Smith was owner of a factory in
the borough of Arden. He made an assignment for benefit of creditors to Arthur
Norman, who immediately took possession of the property. One month afterward
the factory burnt. Smith was absent from
Arden, and Norman was not aware that
the building was insured. Two months
after the fire a box was found which,
when opened, was found to contain a
policy of insurance ip the defendant company for $10,000. He notified the company next day, 61 days after the fire. The
policy had a stipulation, that immediate
notice must be given in case of loss by fire,
otherwise the right to recover would be
considered waived.
The company declines to pay, and this
suit is brought.
LONERGEN and TURNER for plaintiff.
1. Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Finderson v.
Metropole Ins. Co., 57 Vt. 520.
2. Requirements in the by-laws in regard
to the conditions to be performed by the
assured need not be strictly enforced in
cases free from fraud. Burstead v. Ins.
Co., 12 N. Y. 81.

3. When the assignor assigned the
property to the plaintiff, he also made an
equitable assignment of the policy in the
conception of the law. Hence his right
to bring this action. Gourdon v. Ins. Co.
of N. A., 3 Yeates 327; Roussett v. Ins. Co.
of N. A., 1 Binney 427.
BROCK and BROOKS for defendant.
1. Immediate notice is a condition precedent established by the parties. The
Island Ins. and Deposit Co. v. Stauffer,
9 Casey 402 (404).
2. Sixty-one days is no immediate notice. 75 Pa. 378; 44 Ind. 460; 29 Pa. 198.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
The question before us arises out of a
voluntary assignment for the benefit of
creditors, which being a general assignment (U. S. v. Mott, 1 Paine 195) carries
with it the assignment of the insurance
policy (Bank v. Chase, 16 R. I. 37). Hence
the assignee, Mr. Norman, has a legal title
to the insurance policy and its proceeds,
and has a right to bring this action in his
own name.
The only question which remains is,
therefore, whether Mr. Norman by notifying the insurance company on the day
after his finding the policy, sixty-one days
after the fire, fulfille I a condition in the
policy requiring immediate notice of loss
by fire. This, we apprehend, is a question
for your determination. (People's Accident Association v. Smith, 126 Pa. 317;
Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 98 Pa. 280;
Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Brown,
128 Pa. 392).
The stipulation for "immediate notice"
must be interpreted as meaning notice
within a reasonable time, imposing on the
insured the duty of due diligence under
the circums tances, and holding him responsible for laches or unreasonable delay.
(Edwards v. Ins. Co., 75 Pa. 378; People's
Accident Association v. Smith, supra;
Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, supra). Undoubtedly if there Yere no attenuating circumstances in this case the verdict should
be for the defendant. (Trask v. Ins. Co., 29
Pa. 198; Edwards v. Ins. Co., supra). But
the weight of these attenuating circumstances is for your determination.
Therefore, gentlemen, if the weight of
the evidence presented in this case, the
burden of proof beipgonthe plaintiff, shows
that, under all the circumstances of the
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case, notice was given by the plaintiff
within a reasonable time, the plaintiff
using due diligence both in discovering the
policy and in forwarding the notice, then
your verdict should be in favor of the
plaintiff in the amount of $10,000 with interest.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff, being
guilty of laches or unreasonable delay, has
failed to satisfy you by the weight of the
evidence that he gave notice within a
reasonable time under all the circumstances, your verdict should be for the deW. T. STAUFFER, P. J.
fendant.
JOHN THROPE vs. AMOS KENDALL.
Title-Recording of same-Rents-_jectment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Oliver James conveyed a farm to Kendall, Oct. 3, 1898, and the tenant in possession was notified of the possession and
directed to pay rent to Kendall. He did
not agree to do so however. Kendall's
deed was put oil record Jan. 17, 1899.
James fearing that Kendall was not
going to pay the purchase money (none of
which had been taken), conveyed it to
Thrope on Dec. 22, 1898, for the same price,
$3,000, and Thrope, putting his deed on
record on Jan. 3, 1899, demanded rent
from the tenant, who paid one month's
rent to him. The tenant then detarmined
to recognize Kendall as his landlord and
paid the rent falling due on Feb. 15th to
Kendall, and so continued to do until
June 15th, when he gave up the possession to Kendall. Thrope then brought
this ejectment.
ADAMSON and RHODES, J., for plaintiff.

1. The first sale is void as against subsequent purchasers, as it was not recorded
within ninety days, which time is required by statute. Act of May 19, 1893,
P. and L., Vol. 1, Col. 1571. Davey v.
Ruffel, 14 Pa. 0. C. 272.
ELEs and DRUMHELLER for defend-

ant.
1. Possession is thb equivalent of notice.
Jacques v. Weeks, 7 Watts 261; Maul v.
Rider, 59 Pa. 167.
2. Purchaser should not be suffered to
act on probabilities, but should inquire
into the title. Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts

282; Rowe v.
v. Brinser,
Schnyder v.
Co. v. Phila.

Ream, 105 Pa. 543; Anderson
129 Pa. 376 (pages 402-3);
Orr, 149 Pa. 320; Nat. Gas
Co., 158 Pa. 317.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

James conveyed his farm to Kendall
Oct. 3, 1898, and to Thrope on Dec. 22,
1898. When the latter conveyance was
made Kendall's deed was not recorded, nor
was it subsequently, until Jan. 17, 1899.
Thrope's deed was put on record on Jan.
3,1899. The act of May 19, 1893, 1 P. and
L. 1571, declares that unless a deed shall
be recorded within 90 days after its execution it "shall be adjudged fraudulent and
void, against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee f-r a valuable consideration,"
etc. A similar provision had been found
in the act of March 18, 1775, except that
in the latter six months was the time
within which the recording was made
necessary. Under the former of these acts,
it was held that notice, otherwise than by
the record of the deed, would dispense
with the record. Had Thrope been aware
of the conveyance to Kendall, it would
have been an attempt to assist James in a
fraud on Kendall to accept a second conveyance from him.
Not only does actual notice dispense
with the record, but constructive notice
will do the same. The only constructive
notice revealed in this case arises from the
possession of the tenant of James. It is
well settled, that, in the absence of a
record of the deed, the possession by the
grantee, is notice of all that, on inquiry
from him, he would be likely to disclose.
One who buys land, on which there is an
occupant, is bound to suspect that this
occupant has an interest, and, if he fails
to inquire of him, he will take subject to
whatever interest such occupant, really
has. Cf. Brown v. Carey, 149 Pa. 34.
If the previous grantee has put a tenant
in possession, it will be assumed that, on
inquiry, the tenant will state under whom
he claims, so that the inquirer will be referred to his landlord for further information. It is, therefore, the duty of one
contemplating a purchase, and finding
some other than the vender in possession,
to ask him how he holds. This neglected,
it will be assumed that, had inquiry been
made, the tenant would have told the
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truth. Wright v. Woods, 23 Pa. 120;
Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112; Boggs v. Varner,
6 W. & S. 469.
When James conveyed to Kendall
there was a tenant on the farm. James
informed him of the sale and directed him
to pay the rent to Kendall. He thus became the tenant of Kendall. He did not,
it is true, agree to pay rent to the grantee,
but that was unnecessary. The tenant's
attornment is not required in order to bind
him towards the lessors' grantee. When,
on Dec. 22, 1898, Thrope accepted a deed
from James, he would have learned, had
he visited the premises, that they were
occupied, and the occupant would have
told him, if asked, that he was tenant of
Kendall, or, at least, that Kendall had
bought the premises.
We do not attach significance to the
tenant's act in paying one month's rent
to Thrope. This was after Thrope's purchase, and could not have induced him to
make it. The tenant was at least suspicious that he had not doneright in paying
Thrope, for the subsequently accruing rent
he paid to Kendall, to whom, likewise, he
yielded the possession at the end of his

term. It is no greaterhardship to require
intending purchasers of land to inquire of
those on it, than to require them to visit
the recorder's office. It does not appear
that Thrope did either. We think he is
affected with such information as he would
probably have acquired had he gone to the
premises and interrogated the tenant.
It is to be observed, also, that there is
no evidence that Thrope has paid anything
for the land. It was conveyed to him for
$3,000, as it had been to Kendall. We
know that Kendall had paid none of this
sum, and we do not know that Thrope
has paid any. As his right to defeat the
right of Kendall depends on his haiing
(not contracted to pay, but) paid all or
some of the money, the burden was upon
him to show that he had paid. The contract to pay is not the equivalent of payment, and it is the right, as well as the
duty, of Thrope to set.up the loss of ownership of James, on account of his conveyance to Kendall, should he be sued by
James for the purchase money.
As the charge to the court was in conformity with these principles, the motion
for a new trial must be overruled.

